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ANTITRUST POLICY TOOLS & IP RIGHTS:
U.S., TRANSATLANTIC & INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS
MARIANELA LÓPEZ-GALDOS*

ABSTRACT
The paper tracks recent developments in the United States and EU
competition systems with regard to the different policy tools used to address
matters arising from the intersection of IP and competition policies. The
analysis compares the enforcement and advocacy efforts carried out by the
different antitrust agencies in the United States and EU.
This Article first traces how different authorities with antitrust
mandates in the United States have dealt with the issue of balancing the
rights of standard essential patent holders with innovation driven public
welfare. This article then looks at how the antitrust authorities are using
their antitrust statutes (e.g. Section 5 of the FTA Act, merger review
provisions) to tackle IP-rights-related issues that have tenuous connections
to competition concerns.
All of the above issues have been highlighted with the aim to bring
attention to the spillover effects that these moves may have in the national,
transatlantic and international context.

* Principal Researcher at the George Washington University Competition Law Center
(www.gwclc.com). The author is grateful for many useful comments from William E. Kovacic and Gargi
Yadav. The views expressed here are the author alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in prominent competition jurisdictions raise the
question as to whether antitrust laws are being used in an optimal manner
relating to intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), particularly in the context of
Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”). Assuming that the leading
competition regimes acknowledge that antitrust law is about promoting
competition and ultimately consumer welfare, some of the recent case law
involving IPR holders might be blurring this idea and sending the wrong
message to other emerging competition regimes, particularly China.
Given the way the European Union (“EU”) and the United States have
been deciding IPR related matters, they seem to be deviating from the
consumer welfare goal. Furthermore, other jurisdictions, such as Japan,
Korea and Canada, are revising their antitrust guidelines relating to standard
essential patent (“SEP”) holders. As a result, SEP holders will be considered
liable for antitrust violations when seeking injunctions against FRAND1encumbered patent infringers or when renegotiating original FRAND terms
to seek higher royalties. These phenomena give rise to internal legal
dissonance as well as ambiguity in the signals sent to the international
competition regimes—especially the nascent ones and more particularly,
China.
Since the 1990s, the competition community has enlarged vastly, and
there are currently more than 120 competition authorities.2 Many of these
nascent competition authorities operated in the context of emerging market
economies.3 Typically, younger competition authorities look up to more
experienced jurisdictions in search of guidance regarding the
implementation of competition laws in their home countries.4 In most of

1. FRAND stands for “fair reasonable and non-discriminatory,” and the term refers to the
voluntary licensing commitment instituted through an SSO for an IP right that is, or maybe become, a
technical standard in a given industry. [CITATION]. The term “reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(“RAND”) is also commonly used. Please note that the terms FRAND and RAND will be used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
2. William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1042-43 (2012).
3. William E. Kovacic & Ben Slay, Perilous Beginnings: The Establishment of Antimonopoly and
Consumer Protection Programs in the Republic of Georgia, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 15, 15-43 (1998).
4. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic
Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 502 (2012); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and
Consumer
Welfare
in
Antitrust
(Aug.
3,
2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873463;
Huffman,
Symposium,
NeoBehavioralism? (Dec. 23, 2010); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008); Barak
Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011); Joshua

6 LOPEZ-GALDOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/17/16 9:42 AM

ANTITRUST POLICY TOOLS & IP RIGHTS

443

these nascent competition systems, competition regimes are not yet
exclusively concerned about consumer welfare and the promotion of
competition.5 In fact, in young competition regimes, several competition
goals coexist, including over-arching latent political ones.
Against this backdrop, it is alarming to note that leading jurisdictions
with consumer welfare oriented competition systems misinterpret the
antitrust norms in the context of IPR policies. This is a cause of concern, as
many emerging competition systems might view the outcome of recent
developments (in the mature competition systems) in IP and antitrust law as
a validation to continue using competition norms to further nationalistic
goals to the detriment of competition, IPR holders and, ultimately,
innovation.
Joshua Wright clearly phrased this problem in a recent speech where he
described this phenomenon as “a dangerous signal of approval to emerging
antitrust regimes that special rules for IP are desirable from a competition
perspective and that business arrangements involving IPRs may be safely
presumed to be anticompetitive without rigorous economic analysis and
proof of competitive harm.”6
This paper seeks to analyze the recent case law decided in the United
States and EU that explores the interface between antitrust and IP. In order
to appreciate the implications of such case law, this Article looks first at the
legislative framework and case law in question, examines the available
policy tools to address the extant issues and then mulls over the global
spillover effects of such issues.
II. THE KEY CONCERNS OF THE ANTITRUST AND SEPS DEBATE
The setting of standards for essential patents has become indispensable
for the technology industry, as it allows interoperability that, in turn, spurs
technological advancement. Smartphones, e-readers, tablets, laptops and
every other technical gadget that is available in the market is the result and
the sum of a considerable number of inventions that operate together within
a system. To ensure the interoperability of each of the independent devices

D. Wright, Symposium, Abandoning Antitrust Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241 (2012).
5. See J.D. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Oxford
University Press 2010).
6. Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, F.T.C.,, Does the FTC Have a New IP Agenda?, Remarks at the
2014 Milton Handler Lecture: “Antitrust in the 21st Century”, (Mar. 11, 2014).
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when put together, SSOs adopt standards through voluntary consensus.7 The
advantages of having standards set are straightforward. Once a standard has
been adopted, the industry can design and invest in products based on the
standardized technology to the benefit of innovation and consumers.8
The patents of these standards become the so-called standard essential
patents that are incorporated in the design of gadgets. SSOs typically
mandate inclusion of patents in a standard by seeking a commitment from an
SEP owner to license the technology on FRAND terms to ensure that holdups can be precluded.9 Patent hold-ups may occur when an SEP owner’s
bargaining power in negotiating royalties substantially increases after the
technology has been included in the standard designs. In practice, high
switching costs leave the patentee at the mercy of the SEP owner.10
As a consequence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (together, the U.S. Antitrust Agencies)
have raised concerns regarding IPR policies.
Some of the key issues that are at the crossroads of the debate are the
following. Can an exclusion order of the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”) in respect of SEPs adversely impact U.S. consumers, innovation
and, ultimately, society’s future? Should the competition agencies review the
acquisition of SEPs portfolios in the context of merger with a different
standard than mergers that do not include SEPs? Should antitrust be used to
scrutinize IPR-related contracts? What are the implications of these
decisions for the institutional design of the agencies?
To address many of the above questions, the U.S. Antitrust Agencies
and the EU have employed different policy tools. In some instances, such as
the matters involving equitable reliefs, the agencies have focused on
advocacy tools. Differently, to deal with other concerns, the agencies have
used enforcement tools. The option to choose either one of the policy tools
has multiple implications analyzed below in Section 3.

7. See F.T.C, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with
Competition, at 28, 197 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pd.
8. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV., 1889, 1896–97 (2002).
9. See Apple, Inc., v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 400 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that hold-up results
when “an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as
a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”).
10. See Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at.914.
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A. Concern 1: Antitrust to Police Contractual Opportunism
1. The United States
The U.S. Antitrust Agencies have raised concerns regarding the current
equitable reliefs available for patent owners in the United States.
Specifically, they have particularly been unnerved about a grant of injunctive
relief against SEP holders who wish to exploit the terms of patent in an
extractive manner.11
Given that the price of the royalties for the SEP is a subject of
negotiation between the patent owner and patentee, and that such
negotiations usually take place once a patent has been included in a standard,
the SEP owners enjoy a strategic and almost monopolistic leverage when
negotiating royalties for licensing. Further, the patentees cannot negotiate
with SEP owners on an equal footing, as demand for SEPs far outstrips the
supply. Consequently, circumstances become ripe for practicing contractual
opportunism and potentially creating patent “hold-ups” despite the FRAND
commitment. However, there appears to be little administrative or business
recourse from such predicament, as any attempt to fix or cap the royalties
using antitrust norms would be tantamount to violating the tenets of the free
markets.
Before jumping headfirst into the concerns and controversies relating
to patent hold-ups by SEP owners in the United States, it would be useful to
understand the institutional canvas on which such issues play out.
In the United States, patent holders have two main forums where patent
disputes are solved: the district courts and the ITC. Each of the forums
requires different standards and provides divergent solutions to claimants’
patent rights. Since the duality of the U.S. system is at the heart of the U.S.
Antitrust Agencies’ concern relating to patent hold-ups, it is critical to
understand the institutional dichotomy in this regard.12 To this end, each of
the litigation paths available to FRAND encumbered SEP is discussed
summarily below.

11. See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential
Patents: Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (testimony of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r
of the FTC); Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential
Patents: Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (statement of Joseph F. Wayland, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division).
12. See
FTC
Report,
The
Evolving
IP
Marketplace
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pd.
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a. Litigation Before a District Court
The U.S. Code (“U.S.C.”) empowers the competent courts to grant
relief by way of an injunction when a patent infringement arises. In
particular, 35 U.S.C. § 283 provides that “the several courts having
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”13
Up to about 2006, the district courts interpreted this statute favorably
for the patent holders, in many cases immediately granting an injunction
upon a finding of patent infringement.14 While granting such automatic
injunctions, the district courts assumed that monetary damages could not
adequately compensate for patent infringements.15 Owing to this practice of
district courts granting quick injunctive relief upon establishment of patent
infringement, the negotiating power of the licensee was significantly
diminished. Consequently, in many instances, licensees were left with only
two options: Either switch standards and incur heavy expenditures and
delays, or pay high royalties despite the RAND commitments.
In a watershed judgment decided in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to an appeal brought by eBay,16 and eventually overturned
the Federal Circuit’s longstanding standard to automatically grant permanent
injunctive relief against patent infringers.17 In the eBay case, the Supreme
Court examined whether it was appropriate to grant automatic injunctive
relief against patent infringers and concluded that it was not. In doing so, the
Supreme Court adopted a new four-prong test that patent holders have to
satisfy in order to obtain an injunction:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
permanent injunction.18

13. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2015).
14. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, (Fed. Cir. 1983); Smith
Int’l Inc., v Hughes Tool Co., 759 F 2d. 1572, 1574–76 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15. Id.
16. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
17. Id. at 395–96 (Roberts, Ch. J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring)
18. Id. at 391.
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The eBay judgment modified the litigation landscape19 for patent related
cases as illustrated in the figure below:

FIG. 1
The eBay decision weakened patent holders’ bargaining power via the
district court path, by requiring the patent holders to satisfy the equitable
criteria laid down in the four-prong test. Consequently, patent owners could
no longer expect to be granted injunctions as a matter of right; instead,
injunctions became a matter of judicial discretion.
Accordingly, as of date, a patent holder’s recourse to injunctions
through district courts is substantially curtailed, and the strategic option to
litigate before courts to seek better settlements has been limited. The latter is
particularly important for non-practicing patent holders20 who try to abuse
patent rights on the premises of obtaining injunctive relief, which would
hardly meet the eBay test.21
b. Litigating Before the International Trade Commission
The second option for patent holders is to claim their rights before the
ITC. The ITC is a quasi-judicial federal agency responsible for taking direct
action against unfair trade practices and determining the impact of imports
on US industries. The ITC’s five areas of operations are: (1) import injury
19. See Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent
Remedies. 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 543–72 (2008).
20. Non-practicing entities are defined as patent owners that do not make products but assert their
patents against others. These companies may also be referred as “patent trolls.”
21. See Miranda Jones, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name is Patently Not the
Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1035, 14, 1063–70 (2007).
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investigations, (2) intellectual property-based import investigations; (3)
research program; (4) trade information services; and (5) trade policy
support.22
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 empowers the ITC to ban imports
that, inter alia, infringe patents.23 Once default has been established, the ITC
may seek immediate relief—an exclusion order, a cease and desist order or
both—against the defaulting party.24 In issuing an order of foregoing nature,
the ITC may consider the effect of such orders upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy, the production of like
or directly competitive articles in the United States, as well as U.S.
consumers and public interest at large.25
Given such broad discretion of the ITC, it is likely that stakeholders do
not stand the eBay analysis, but wish to gain traction or likely seek
jurisdiction before the ITC. However, the likelihood of an import ban order
from the ITC remains slim.
In order to seek an import restriction before the ITC, patent holders have
to comply with two preconditions. First, patent holders must prove that
goods are being imported into the US. Second, patent holders must
demonstrate that they developed activities related to the patent-in-suit in the
US. Clearly, the two prerequisites restrict jurisdiction of the ITC to import
related cases affecting the US industry.
Ideally, this option should remain very limited for non-practicing
entities, since the domestic industry requirement would not be met.26 But in
1988, the legislature noted that non-practicing entities should be entitled to
obtain remedies from the ITC,27 allowing non-practicing entities to continue
to use the ITC litigation path.28

22. See USITC, About the USITC, UNITED STATES INT’L TRADE COMM’N (last visited Mar. 21,
2016), https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm
23. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (2004).
24. https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm
25. https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf
26. See, e.g., 337-TA-694, USITC Pub. 4292 (June 22, 2011).
27. See 132 Cong. Rec. H. 1782, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Apr. 10, 1986).
28. The non-practicing entity Walker Digital recently filed a complaint before the ITC for patent
infringement regarding Blu-ray disc players. It based its domestic industry allegations on licenses it has
with companies that sell Blu-ray disk players that practice the patent-in-suit. More details available at
http://www.itcblog.com/non-practicing-entity-walker-digital-files-new-337-complaint-regardingcertain-blu-ray-disc-players-relying-solely-on-licensing-activities-for-alleged-domestic-industry.
On
January 5, 2012, the ITC voted to institute the investigation against thirty-five entities, including LG,
Panasonic,
Samsung,
Sony,
and
Toshiba.
More
information
available
at
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2012/er0105kk2.htm
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Recently, the Federal Circuit ruled on whether licensing efforts and
litigation expenditures related to a patent-in-suit were sufficient to meet the
ITC’s domestic industry requirement.29 The court held that “expenditures on
patent litigation do not automatically constitute evidence of the existence of
an industry in the US established by substantial investment in the
exploitation of a patent.”30
The figure below sets out different US authorities with jurisdiction over
matters related to patent rights and their specific concerns.

Money Damages
District Court
Injunctive Relief
(eBay)
Patent Holder
Exclusion Orders
ITC
Cease-andDesist Order
FIG. 2
c. The Federal Trade Commission’s Viewpoint
In July 2012, Commissioner Edith Ramirez testified on behalf of the
FTC before the US Senate and highlighted the FTC’s concern regarding
ITC’s exclusion orders in favor of SEP owners.31 According to the FTC, the
ITC is attracting litigation by patent holders that would have difficulties in

29. John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322 (June 24, 2011).
30. Id. at 1328.
31. See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential
Patents, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (testimony of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r
of the FTC); Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential
Patents, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (statement of Joseph F. Wayland, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice).
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obtaining injunctive relief in district courts after the eBay decision.32 It
appears that the FTC disapproves of SEP owners litigating before the ITC
and opines that the ITC’s failure to consider equitable factors when issuing
an exclusionary order or refusing to grant monetary damages raises systemic
risks.
To solve this problem, the FTC proposed two main solutions. First, the
ITC may grant relief to SEP owners under the broad public interest
consideration criterion by considering public welfare, the competitive
conditions in the US economy and US consumers when deciding whether to
grant an exclusion order under § 337.33
By relying on public interest premises, the FTC suggested the ITC could
deny an exclusion order if the patent owner had not complied with its RAND
obligations, including the duty to negotiate in good faith. Alternatively, the
FTC proposed that the ITC delay the effective date of its § 337 remedies,
subject to the parties mediating in good faith for damages for past
infringement and/or an ongoing royalty for future licensed use. Moreover,
the FTC argued in favor of limiting the injunctive remedies of SEP holders
that had committed to RAND, especially given that the patent system would
not be undermined: Patent holders would still have the possibility to seek
damages for past infringements and other non-injunctive relief.34 Finally, if
the ITC fails to consider competition as a public interest concern, the FTC
may call Congress for a statutory amendment.
d. The Department of Justice’s Viewpoint
Also, in July 2012, Joseph Wayland, an acting Assistant Attorney
General in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, testified before the Senate’s
Judiciary Committee, concerned about potential patent hold-ups arising from
litigation before the ITC.35 Wayland suggested that the ITC “should continue
to gather the types of information necessary to evaluate whether the statutory
public interest factors counsel against the imposition of an exclusion

32. Id.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (permitting the ITC to consider “the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States consumers.”)
34. Prepared Statement of The F.T.C. Before the U.S. S. Committee on the Judiciary Concerning
Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Ord. to Enforce Standard Essential Patents (July
11, 2012), www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/120711standardpatents.pdf.
35. Regarding Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce StandardsEssential Patents, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. S. (July 11, 2012) (Statement of Joseph
F.
Wayland,
Acting
Assistant
Att’y
Gen.
Antitrust
Division),
www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/284982.pdf.
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order.”36 Thus, the DOJ appears to tacitly support the ITC’s endeavor to
consider FRAND-encumbered patent litigation under the public interest
umbrella.
According to Wayland, the appropriateness of exclusion orders reliant
upon FRAND-encumbered SEP’s merits special attention for
interoperability reasons. The DOJ foresees potential patent hold-ups that
could result in the exclusion of competitors from a market, and in higher
royalties that eventually are passed on to consumers.
As a solution, the DOJ has suggested that the ITC “ha[ve] the authority
to stay the imposition of an exclusion order contingent on the infringing
party’s commitment to abide by an arbitrator’s determination of the fair
value of a license.”37 In other words, in cases where the issue at stake is
limited to the determination of the FRAND terms, the DOJ proposes that the
ITC delays the imposition of an exclusion order, and allows a third party to
determine the licensing terms.
More recently, the DOJ and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”)38 have published a policy statement expressing their concern
about the potential impact of exclusion orders on the U.S. competitive
conditions and consumers involving RAND-encumbered SEPs.39 These two
agencies argue that injunctive relief remedies involving RAND-encumbered
SEP patents should be determined on the need to provide for incentives to
innovators to participate in standards-setting activities and the necessity to
provide appropriate compensation to patent holders.40
In the policy statement, the DOJ and USPTO both argued that public
interest should preclude the issuance of such exclusion orders in certain
cases.41 Moreover, the DOJ and USPTO urge the ITC to consider whether
monetary damages would be an appropriate remedy for infringement of
RAND encumbered SEP patents.42 Alternatively, and in the same line as the
FTC, the DOJ and the USPTO suggest delaying “the effective date of an

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The USPTO is the executive-branch agency charged with responsibility for examining patent
applications, issuing patents, and—through the Secretary of Commerce—advising the President on
domestic and certain international issues of intellectual property policy.
39. United States Department of Justice & United States Patent & Trademark Office, Policy
Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments
(January
8,
2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJPTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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exclusion order for a limited period of time to provide parties the opportunity
to conclude a F/RAND license.”43
The U.S. Antitrust Agencies are concerned that “a patent holder may
use the threat of an ITC exclusion order, or an injunction issued in district
court, to hold-up or demand higher royalties or other more costly licensing
terms after the standard is implemented that could have been obtained before
its IP was included in the standard.”44 In particular, U.S. Antitrust Agencies
have raised concerns in regards to the discrepancy of solutions offered by
district courts and the ITC in SEP litigation cases. The U.S. Antitrust
Agencies are antagonized by the possibility that SEP owners can obtain
injunctions from the district courts; thus circumventing the equitable test for
injunction laid down in the landmark eBay decision. This gulf between the
approach to grant relief to SEP owners by the district courts on one hand,
and the ITC on the other, has become more pronounced in recent cases.45
According to the U.S. Antitrust Agencies, the ITC has become the
preferred jurisdiction for patent owners to abuse their rights since 2006. As
a consequence, SEP owners are awarded exclusion orders that substantially
increase the costs of small components. Thus, royalties do not reflect market
competition, but rather the price resulting from the hold-up. Eventually, the
patent hold-ups result in the increase of prices to the consumers, distort
incentives to innovate and undermine the standard setting process.
2. The European Union
The EU, as well as some of its member states, is confronting similar
problems as the United States with patent hold-ups and injunctive reliefs. It
is interesting to briefly analyze the policy options existing in some of these
jurisdictions since the verdict of one court has a cascading impact in
transatlantic litigation and businesses.
a. The European Union Approach
The litigation culture of the United States is markedly different from
the enforcement culture existing elsewhere, especially in the EU. In the EU,
the European Commission (“EC”) regards antitrust enforcement policies,

43. Id.
44. Prepared Statement of The F.T.C., supra note 34.
45. See Third Party U.S. F.T.C.’s Statement on the Pub. Int., In re Certain Wireless Communication
Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA 745 (June 6, 2012), www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf; see In re Certain Gaming and
Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf.
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including antitrust investigations, as a sufficient tool to impede potential
abuses from SEP owners.
For example, in the Google/Motorola Mobility merger, the EC cleared
the transaction, relying on the fact that the EC is empowered to investigate
abuse of dominance cases and when such anti-competitive behavior
surfaces. In particular, the EC stated, “The Commission considers that
Google’s incentives to use the threat of injunctions to forcibly extract crosslicenses from good faith licensees are most likely to be constrained by the
prospect of an investigation based on Article 102 TFEU.”46
Nonetheless, the EC has also reiterated that if good faith negotiations
fail, patent owners may seek injunctions. According to the EC, “[i]n the
event licensing discussions fail, the SEP holder may ultimately take its
counter-party to court and seek an injunction.”47 Therefore, in the EU, it is
legitimate for the SEP holder to seek injunctions if the following two-prong
test is met: (i) the licensor tries to negotiate in good faith with the licensee
and (ii) the licensee is not willing to negotiate in good faith on FRAND
terms.48
Recent case law has brought some clarity on this front in the EU. In the
Motorola decision of 2014, the court held that a refusal to license by a
dominant company (EU law considers SEPs owners dominant by definition)
would constitute a violation of Article 102 of the TFEU only in “exceptional
circumstances.”49 Notably, those “exceptional circumstances” include the
situation where an SEP owner commits to license SEPs on FRAND terms in
the context of an SSO.
Furthermore, the European Court will soon decide whether an SEP
owner has the obligation to license if it has given a FRAND promise in the
context of the Huawei v. ZTE case.50 The following table51 summarizes the
EU context in relation to the availability of equitable relief for SEP owners.
46. Google/Motorola Mobility Merger Procedure, COMP/M.6381 (European Comm’n 2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Comm’n Decision addressed to Motorola Mobility LLC relating to proceedings under Article
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, at
39985
(European
Comm’n
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39985/39985_928_16.pdf.
50. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. v ZTE Deutschland GmBH, C-170/13 at *57-58 (CJEU 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d538681487d4074efbb18cd5
8cc2d504aa.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4OchaQe0?text=&docid=159827&pageIndex=0&doclang=en
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=487416.
51. This table is copied from the OECD background material by Maurits Dolmans (Cleary
Glottlieb, London) for Item VII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18
December 2014.
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Table 1: Maurits Dolmans (Cleary Glottlieb, London) for Item VII of the
122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17–18 December
2014.
SEP Owner has offered
a license on terms to be
set by a court or
arbitral tribunal

Injunction
denied/irrelevant
User has offered to
take a license on
terms to be set by a
court or arbitral
tribunal

User has offered to
take a license on
specific terms, but
has not agreed to be
bound by terms set
by a court or arbitral
tribunal

User has not offered
to take a license (and
has no objective
justification to refuse
to take a license) or
user’s conduct is
purely tactical and/or
dilatory and/or not
serious

License terms are set
by court or arbitral
tribunal (and injunction
request, if not
withdrawn, is denied or
suspended)

Injunction granted
unless Court finds
terms offered by user
are FRAND and SEP
owner does not accept
them

Injunction granted

SEP Owner has offered
a license on specific
terms, but has not
agreed to be bound by
terms set by a court or
arbitral tribunal

SEP Owner has not
offered terms and
refuses to submit to
court/arbitration (and
has not objective
justification to refuse
to grant a license)

Injunction suspended
pending FRAND
review, and granted if
Court finds terms
offered by SEP owner
are GRAND and user
does not accept
Injunction denied
Injunction denied if
Court finds terms
offered by SEP owner
are not FRAND, or if
the user accepts the
FRAND terms the
owner offers

Same as above

Injunction denied

Same as above

Injunction denied,
unless user has
explicitly refused to
take a license, or user’s
conduct is purely
tactical and/or dilatory
and/or not serious
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Based on the table above, it appears that the injunctive relief to SEP
owners in the EU is available only when there is an objective justification
for seeking such relief.
Notwithstanding the EC approach, the EU member states have adopted
different approaches not always in line with the EC, as discussed below.
Illustratively, Germany’s Mannheim Court allows parties to seek injunctions
against SEP assertion,52 whereas in the UK, the High Court has ruled that an
injunction should not be available to an owner of a SEP if there are FRAND
obligations.53
b. The German Approach
Recently, in a significant ruling in the realm of SEP patent infringement
suits, the Regional Court of Mannheim (in Germany) allowed Motorola to
seek an injunction against Microsoft when asserting patents related to a
standard (the H.264 Video CODEC) applicable to Windows 7 and XBox
360.54 The court ruled that “[FRAND] cannot be understood as a binding
license offer to any number of third parties unknown to the plaintiff,
requiring only acceptance by a third party, but is a request to license seekers
to submit their own FRAND offers.”55
Moreover, the Mannheim Court stated that a FRAND pledge does not
constitute a
waiver by the patent holder of injunctive relief as a means of enforcing its
patent claims against an unknown number of potential patent infringers . . .
a patent holder who submits a patent statement and licensing declaration
form merely offers to waive its exclusivity rights under the patent by
establishing a license agreement—and not unconditionally.56

To prevent the enforcement of the German Court ruling, a U.S. district
court ordered a restraining order barring Motorola from enforcing the
Mannheim ruling.57 The appellate panel considered that the U.S. district
court ruling did not infringe comity principles, since the litigation procedure

52. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html
53. Foss Patents, UK High Court Denies Patent Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND
Commitment, May 30, 2012, http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patentinjunction.html.
54. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html
55. See, Foss Pats., The German Approach to FRAND: Let’s Err on the Side of Injunctions (May
23, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html.
56. Id.
57. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html
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under the U.S. contract had been initiated before the German case was filed
and both corporations were American.58
Essentially, according to the Mannheim Court, when a SEP holder that
made a FRAND commitment made some attempts to negotiate a license and
such negotiations failed (whether or not those attempts were made in good
faith), it can seek injunctive relief unless its actions constitute a violation of
antitrust laws.59 To put it simply, the Mannheim Court contradicts the policy
adopted by U.S. district courts after the eBay judgment and does not entirely
comply with the EU’s policy since the German court does not mandate good
faith negotiations.60
c. The UK Approach
In the UK, the High Court refused an injunction to IPCom against Nokia
in a dispute relating to a 3G standard called UMTS.61 In particular, the patentin-suit detailed how access channels are assigned to users in 3G networks.62
Nokia lost the case, but notwithstanding the fact that the UK High Court
asserted the validity of IPCom patents, it denied IPCom’s request for an
injunction.63
In particular, the UK High Court stated:
I have to say in those circumstances I am very uncertain, to put it mildly,
to see why a permanent injunction should be granted in this case at all or
indeed any injunction. It seems to me a classic case for consideration of
the [Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co] criteria, given these
circumstances. You are willing to give a license. Nokia wants to get a
license. You cannot agree on the terms. They will be determined. There
will then be a license. In those circumstances for a non (unclear) to get an
injunction seems to me quite extraordinary. That has been raised in the
written arguments. It seems to me that is the area which I would like you
to address me because that may resolve this matter quite apart from all
these difficult questions of what the different German judgments mean
and which principles of res judicata should be applied. It comes down then

58. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/us-court-extends-ban-motorola-cant.html
59. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html
60. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest 19
fig. 3 (Cornell Law Rev. 2012, Stanford Law Working Paper No. 2022168), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022168. The statistics show a drop from a grant
rate of about 95 percent pre-eBay to about 75 percent post-eBay.
61. Nokia GmbH v IPCom GmbH & Co. KG, [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch) (May 18, 2012).
62. Id.
63. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-injunction.html
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to the discretion of this court whether it is appropriate to grant an
injunction at all.64

The fact that IPCom is a non-practicing entity might have influenced the UK
High Court’s decision.
The Shelfer case is an old ruling that established the test used to decide
when injunctive relief may be denied because monetary compensation is
sufficient.65 There are considerable similarities between the Shelfer and the
eBay rulings.66
Despite what the UK High Court Judge stated in Nokia v. IPCom, the
Shelfer jurisprudence holds in the UK, even though it is not an exhaustive
test. In fact, the debate over public interest and equitable relief still persists
in British courts, as UK Courts have adopted different approaches to the
debate over public interest. In some instances, the courts have considered
granting injunctive relief for public interest reasons.67 In other instances,
however, the UK courts have considered that the Patent Act was sufficient
to protect the public interest.68
B. Concern 2: Breach of FRAND Commitments as an Antitrust Violation
The FTC argues that in the post-eBay judgment era, patent litigation has
shifted from district courts to the ITC, which remains a more favorable
jurisdiction for SEP owners.69 The debate over the ITC’s usage of public
interest considerations in its decisions leads to a more general follow up
question pertaining to the appropriateness of the antitrust competition
agencies to discuss FRAND-encumbered SEPs disputes.

64. Foss Pats., UK High Ct. Denies Pat. Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND
Commitment (May 30, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patentinjunction.html.
65. Shelfer v. City of London Elec. Lighting Co., 1 Ch 287 *304 (1984).
66. Id. (holding that damages may be awarded if a four prong test is met: (i) the injury to the
claimant’s legal rights must be small; (ii) it must be capable of being estimated in money; (iii) it must be
adequately compensated by a small money payment; and (iv) the case must be one in which it would be
oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction).
67. See, e.g,. Roussel-Uclaf v. G. D. Searle and Co. Ltd., F.S.R. 125 (High Ct. of Just., Chancery
Division 1976) (holding that when the infringing product is a unique, lifesaving drug, “it is at least very
doubtful if the court in its discretion ever ought to grant an injunction and I cannot at present think of any
circumstances where it should”)
68. See, e.g. Chiron v Murex (Aldous, J.) (stating the patent act was sufficient to protect the public
interest). According to the court it was inherent in the patent system that patents would sometimes impede
research, and the research exception in the Patents Act of 1977 was sufficient to protect the public interest,
more information available http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/28371/injunctions-englishpatent-litigation-big-thing-small-winner-takes-all.
69. The FTC nonetheless quotes a study that refers to the triplication of patent challenges in the
past ten years due to imports rather than for reasons related to the eBay judgment.
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When a patent owner commits to FRAND licensing, it implicitly
acknowledges that a royalty is adequate compensation for a licensee to use
that patent. In other words, FRAND-encumbered patent owners assume that
their ultimate goal, for which they engage in such commitments, is to obtain
monetary compensation. Therefore, the use of remedies other than monetary
damages should remain residual. However, antitrust authorities both in the
United States and in the EU have used competition concerns to challenge
conduct relating to SEP in the context of the standard setting process. As
discussed later, the U.S. FTC has relied on Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) to police some corporations with regards to
the IPR policies.70 In contrast, in the EU, the EC and other national
authorities rely on the broader EU legislation to sanction particularly
dominant firms for IPR related infringements.
1. The United States
The U.S. Agencies have traditionally relied on the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act as its primary antitrust enforcement tools. The FTC, however,
has also made use of the FTC Act provisions as an additional enforcement
tool. In particular, the FTC has authority to bring, among other things,71
administrative proceedings challenging “unfair methods of competition”—
including conduct that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act—under § 5 of the
FTC Act.
In theory, an SEP owner’s licensing practices could be addressed under
both § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act. However, taking U.S.
Supreme Court cases into consideration, it is difficult to imagine that an SEP
owner would be found liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act. To overcome
this enforcement challenge, the FTC has been relying on § 5 to bring standalone actions, including those against SEP owners.
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits both “unfair and deceptive acts and
practices” and “unfair methods of competition,” without further detailing
practices that belong under each of those categories.72 The FTC has recently

70. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
71. The FTC can also issue a cease and desist order and seek enforcement of that order, including
civil penalties and injunctive relief, in federal court. Additionally, the FTC may apply for injunctive relief
pending adjudication of its own administrative complaint or, in a “proper case,” for permanent injunctive
relief against entities that have violated or threaten to violate the laws it administers. William E. Kovacic
& Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission
Act,
76
ANTITRUST
L.J.
929
(2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/competition-policy-andapplication-section-5-ftc-act-marc-winerman/2010kovacicwinermanpolicyapp.pdf.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).

6 LOPEZ-GALDOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

ANTITRUST POLICY TOOLS & IP RIGHTS

6/17/16 9:42 AM

459

made some efforts to issue some form of guidance on the scope of § 5 of the
FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition.”73 Despite some
efforts devoted to the clarification of which anticompetitive practices can be
sanctioned under § 5, the lack of clear and substantive guidance allows the
FTC to expand its use to certain practices.74 However, from a strategic
viewpoint, this expansion might have a boomerang effect against the FTC as
the leading U.S. antitrust institution (shifting to the DOJ as the preferred
institution) and internationally.75
In November 2012, the FTC stated, “Patent holders that seek injunctive
relief against willing licensees of their FRAND-encumbered SEPs should
understand that in appropriate cases the Commission can and will challenge
this conduct as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.”76 This statement was made in the context of the Robert Bosch GmbH
acquisition of SPX services from SPX Corporation.77 But earlier than 2012,
the FTC had already reached several settlements with corporations based on
the underlying principle that § 5 of the FTC Act could be used to sanction
businesses for carrying out anticompetitive practices.78 In 1996, the FTC had
its first case showing a willingness to expand the use of § 5 to enforce
antitrust in the IPR field.79 This very first case involved Dell Corporation,
that had “certified” that it had no IP on a computer related standard, and later

73. FTC Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act (2015); Joshua D. Wright & Angela Diveley, Unfair Methods of Competition
After the 2015 Commission Statement, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (2015).
74. DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735371/150813ohlhausendissentfinal.pd
f (relating to the FTC statement of enforcement principles regarding “unfair methods of competition”
under section 5 of the FTC Act).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Section 5 prohibits entities from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in interstate commerce, and states, in pertinent part:
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations, [except certain specified financial and industrial sectors] from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.
Id.
76. See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Statement of the Fed. Trade Commission, FTC File
Number 121-0081, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf.
77. See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC in the Matter of
Robert
Bosch
GmbH
FTC
File
Number
121-0081,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf.
78. See M. Sean Royall, The Role of Antitrust in Policing Unilateral Abuses of Standard-Setting
Processes,
ANTITRUST
MAG.,
Spring
2004,
at
44-–49,
http://www.lawseminars.com/materials/08NDATATB/ndatatb%20m%20Royall.pdf.
79. See In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp., FTC No. C-3658, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 (Decision
and Order) (May 20, 1996).

6 LOPEZ-GALDOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

460

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

6/17/16 9:42 AM

[Vol 15:441

challenged a standard under § 5 on the ground that its technology was being
used.80 The FTC concluded that Dell had misled the SSO, due to its failure
to disclose its IPRs.81 Eventually, the parties settled, and Dell agreed not to
collect royalties when its patent was used in the standard.82
Following the Dell settlement, the FTC continued with its efforts to
expand the use of § 5 in the N-Data case,83 which was eventually settled.84
The FTC considered that N-Data had engaged in post-contractual
opportunism by not honoring a promise to license patents that had been
adopted as a standard.85 According to the FTC, N-Data was trying to extract
higher royalty fees once its technology had been widely adopted, and these
practices constituted violations of § 5.86
More recently, in 2012, the FTC issued a decision and ordered against
Bosch. The FTC used as a legal basis the FTC’s § 5 on the basis of a breach
of a commitment to license SEP to standard.87 Briefly, Bosch had committed
to licensing patents that were necessary to a standard in an air conditioning
related technology.88 The Bosch decision followed the FTC’s N-Data

80. Id.
81. See Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 618 (1996) (Complaint, Decision, and Order)],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 1999/08/9823563c3888dell.htm.
82. Id.
83. See In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 0510094 (Jan. 23, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080923ndsdo.pdf.
84. See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094 (Decision and Order) (Jan. 23, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf
85. Dissenting Statement of Chairman Majoras, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC,
FTC
No.
0510094,
(2008).
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122majoras.pdf. Chairman Majoras
argues that the facts did not support antitrust liability because, in her view, N-Data’s actions were
consistent with IEEE policy and practice. Id. In addition, Chairman Majoras questioned whether “N-Data
enjoyed measurable market power” through its NWay patents, concluding instead that NWay was an
“optional technique” for Ethernet manufacturers. Id. In any event, the industry was partly to blame for NData’s position because no company had sought a license to use NWay prior to Vertical’s 2002 “revision”
of National’s promise. Id. In short, Chairman Majoras’s findings of fact were very different than the facts
described by the Commission majority. Commissioner Kovacic, writing separately, concluded that NData’s conduct did not violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, but did not comment on whether Section 2 of
the Sherman Act applied. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic, In the Matter of
Negotiated
Data
Solutions
LLC,
FTC
No.
0510094,
(2008).
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122kovacic.pdf.
86. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of Negotiated
Data
Solutions
LLC,
FTC
No.
051
0094,
at
4
(Jan.
23,
2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122analysis.pdf.
87. See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC In the Matter of
Robert
Bosch
GmbH
FTC
File
Number
121-0081,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf.
88. See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC In the Matter of
Robert
Bosch
GmbH
FTC
File
Number
121-0081,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf.
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Consent Order that noted that “the Supreme Court has not hesitated to
impose antitrust liability on conduct that threatens to undermine the
standard-setting process or to render it anticompetitive.”89 Finally, in 2013,
the FTC issued a consent order in an investigation of Google, and ratified a
consent decree that contained only some commitments from Google to
modify certain elements of its business and no other provisions of legal
consequence.90 With such a consent order, both the FTC and Google avoided
the long winding litigation route.
The FTC has also confronted cases where § 2 of the Sherman Act was
used to target IP related monopolizations. In 2003, in the UNOCAL case, the
FTC determined through an administrative complaint that the company had
wrongfully acquired monopoly power, attempted to monopolize and
unreasonably restraint trade.91 The FTC opined that UNOCAL manipulated
the standard setting process by persuading the Board of California Air
Resources to adopt certain standards at the same time that it acquired certain
patents overlapping with those standards.92 The FTC prevented UNOCAL
from enforcing such patents.93 It was not until 2005, in the context of a
merger with Chevron Corporation, that UNOCAL agreed with the FTC not
to enforce the relevant patents.94
One year later, in 2006, the FTC found that RAMBUS violated § 2 of
the Sherman Act, because it failed to disclose certain pending patents
applications to the SSO, in order to monopolize markets for computer
memory technologies that were included in the standard.95 In other words,
the FTC alleged that a deception or failure to disclose an SEP before the
SSOs constituted a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC considered
that two other scenarios could have existed, had it not been for RAMBUS’s
strategy to deceive the SSO: either (i) the SSO would have selected an
alternative non-proprietary technology different from the one included in
RAMBUS’ patents or (ii) if the SSO had chosen RAMBUS’s technology, it

89. See https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122analysis.pdf
90. In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaagree.pdf.
91. See In the Matter of Union Oil Co., FTC Docket No. 9305 (July 7, 2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/07/040706commissionopinion.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Joseph Farrell, et. al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603,
603, 607 (2007), http://eml.berkeley.edu/~farrell/ftp/FHSS_ALJ_2007.pdf.
95. See Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08- 694, 2009 WL
425102 (Feb. 23, 2009), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/2008%20Rambus.pdf.
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would have demanded a commitment to license its technology on FRAND
terms.96
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the case and ruled in favor of RAMBUS, as
it considered that RAMBUS could only be held liable under the first
scenario.97 Eventually, in an appeal to the Supreme Court, the FTC lost the
case, because the Court denied the certiorari.98 As a result, the FTC’s ability
to use § 2 of the Sherman Act to build a case of antitrust based on IP matters
remains limited.99
In contrast to the RAMBUS decision, Qualcomm v. Broadcom
foreshadows the possibility of a corporation being held liable under § 2 of
the Sherman Act for failure to license its technology under FRAND terms.100
Broadcom filed a case against Qualcomm, alleging that the latter was
violating the FRAND terms when licensing its technology previously
incorporated through an SSO. The district Court dismissed the complaint.101
But, on review, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the dismissal,
and reinstated the case.102 Eventually, the Third Circuit decided that:
the [N.J. District] Court reasoned that Qualcomm enjoyed a legallysanctioned monopoly in its patented technology, and that this monopoly
conferred the right to exclude competition and set the terms by which that
technology was distributed. . . . [T]he inclusion of¯. . . [the] technology in
the [] standard did not harm competition because an absence of
competition was the inevitable result of any standard-setting process.103

2. The European Union
The resolution of cases involving SEP in the context of SSOs in the EU
differs from the U.S. evolution of the FTC’s settlements. The main reason
for this divergence is the fact that EU competition laws in this context are
broader than § 2 of the Sherman Act. The flexibility available to the EU
competition courts in FRAND-encumbered SEPs is responsible for this
chasm in the transatlantic systems’ approaches. In the EU, the spectrum of
practices that Article 102 of the TFEU grants gives more flexibility to the

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: The
Rambus and Broadcom Decisions, 28 U. IOWA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 08-25 (July 20, 2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002.
100. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311, 312 (3d Cir. 2007).
101. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., “Qualcomm II”, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2008).
102. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311, 312 (3d Cir. 2007).
103. Id. at 305 (internal quotations omitted).
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EC to use competition law to rule over FRAND of SEPs in the context of
SSOs.104
In 2007, similar to the case filed by the FTC, the EC opened a case
against RAMBUS for breach of Article 102, TFEU.105 The EC considered
that RAMBUS was seeking unreasonable royalties for the use of patents in
the computer memory chips market, and as such, was abusing its dominant
position. In parallel to the U.S. litigation, the EC claimed that “by not
disclosing the existence of the patents which it later claimed were relevant
to the adopted standard” Rambus may have committed a form of “patent
ambush.”106 In addition, the EC stated that “by subsequently claiming
unreasonable royalties for the use of those relevant patents,” RAMBUS had
abused its dominant position. 107 RAMBUS settled the case with the EC and
agreed to cap the royalties for its new technology and to license older patents
at no cost.108
In 2005, Broadcom, Ericsson, NEC, Nokia, Panasonic Mobile
Communications, and Texas Instrument Search lodged complaints with the
EC against Qualcomm, which holds certain essential patents in the standard
for mobile telephones. The complaint was based on the allegations that
Qualcomm violated the FRAND terms to which it had agreed, in the context
of the SSO relating to the chipset downstream markets. The EC closed
investigations without taking action, because the EC could not prove that the
license fees were unreasonably high.109
More recently, the question of compulsory licensing has been reviewed
by the Court of Justices, in the ZTE-Huawei case.110 The case concerns the
question of whether an action for infringement brought by the holder an SEP
who has committed to granting licenses on FRAND terms constitutes an
abuse of a dominant position. The Advocated General Wathelet opined:
104. See Piotr Staniszewski, The Interplay Between IP Rights and Competition Law in the Context
of Standardization, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 666, 671 n.52 (2007) (“In contrast to US law, Art 81
and 82 EC do not require an element of intention to prove anticompetitive conduct.”).
105. See Commission Decision (EC), Case COMP/38.636 - Rambus, of 9 Dec. 2009, art. 102,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38636/38636_1203_1.pdf.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. https://www.rambus.com/european-commission-accepts-rambus-commitments-in-finalsettlement/
109. See Standard Essential Patents and Injunctive Relief, JONES DAY (Apr. 2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028906e1297060b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents.pdf.
110. See Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1160150.
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In order to honor that commitment and to avoid abusing a dominant
position, the SEP holder must, before making a request for corrective
measures or seeking an injunction, alert the infringer to the infringement
at issues in writing, giving reasons, and specifying the SEP concerned and
the way in which it has been infringed by that company, unless it has been
established that the alleged infringer is fully aware of the infringement.
The SEP holder must, in any event, present the alleged infringer with a
written offer of a licence on FRAND terms and that offer must contain all
the terms normally included in a license in the sector in question, including
the precise amount of the royalty and the way in which that amount is
calculated.111

In July 2015, the Court of Justice admitted that an antitrust violation
could exist under EU law when seeking injunctive relief relating to a
FRAND-encumbered SEP.112 That said, in it’s decision, the Court of Justice
adopted a safe harbor that foresees several requirements that, if met, would
exclude injunctive relief seekers from liability.113 In detail, FRANDencumbered SEP holders would be required to take the following steps
before they seeking injunctions against potential infringers without violating
EU competition law:
1. SEP holders must alert SEP users of the alleged infringement;
2. SEP users must indicate a willingness to conclude a license on
FRAND terms;
3. SEP holders must present a detailed written offer for a license on
FRAND terms;
4. SEP users must respond promptly and in good faith, and not engage
in delaying tactics;
5. If the SEP user does not accept the offer, it must submit, promptly
and in writing, a specific counter-offer on FRAND terms;
6. If no agreement is reached, an SEP user that is already using the
technology must provide appropriate security and be able to render
accounts;
7. The amount of the royalty may, by common agreement, be
determined by an independent third party;
8. SEP users can challenge validity, essentiality, and infringement in
parallel to licensing negotiations and also after conclusion of the
license agreement.114

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the Court of Justice
has been tempted to adopt a middle ground position by balancing SEP
owners and licensees’ interests. In other words, FRAND-encumbered SEP
owners will continue to have the right to seek injunctions, but with
limitations.
The long awaited judgment raises many questions as to the
implementation of the safe harbor and the role that national courts will play
in such respect. Nonetheless, the balancing position adopted by the European
Court of Justice is a better option than completely eliminating the right to
seek injunctions to SEP owners that have committed to FRAND terms. In
this sense, nascent jurisdictions focusing on the same matter should consider
the European approach if the only alternative is to consider seeking
injunctions a per se violation of antitrust norms with respect to FRANDencumbered SEP owners.
C. Concern 3: Abusing Merger Review Involving SEPs
Merger review procedures exist as a part of almost every competition
system as an enforcement mechanism preventing anticompetitive
transactions from materializing in the markets. Typically, corporations are
required to file a merger before the relevant authorities when the deals meet
the notification thresholds. However, recent developments, and in particular
the Bosch and Google decisions, have removed the FTC’s blinkers in such
matters and have revealed that the U.S., authorities and eventually the EU
authorities might utilize merger review processes to tackle IPR issues.
1. The United States
In Bosch, it is interesting to note that the FTC admitted to deciding to
tackle the SEP issues together with the clearance of the proposed merger.115
But the key question that remains is whether the FTC would have been
concerned about Bosch’s IPR issues if it had not been for the Hart-Scott
Rodino (“HSR”) filing.116
Shortly after Bosch, the FTC again resorted to its merger review powers
to tackle certain SEP issues of Google’s subsidiary, Motorola Mobility.117

115. See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC
File Number 121-0081, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf.
116. Elyse Dorsey & Matthew R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and
Outcomes of Frand Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252006.
117. Motorola
Mobility
LLC,
FTC
File
No.
121-0120
(Jan.
3,
2013),
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolado.pdf.
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Here, the FTC concluded that Motorola Mobility had infringed § 5 of the
FTC Act because it had not honored its licensing commitments to the
SSOs.118 In particular, the FTC determined that Motorola Mobility was in
breach of its FRAND commitments by filing a case before the ITC seeking
injunction and exclusion orders.119 Therefore, again, the FTC used its
mandate to review mergers to address IPR issues and expanded the usage of
§ 5. The case was settled.120
The resolution of Bosch and Motorola Mobility represent the
increasingly aggressive attitude of the FTC towards the SEP in SSOs that
may eventually lead more and more to transactions being refused clearance
on grounds other than competition related concerns. Recent policy changes
by the FTC in HSR filings in the pharmaceutical sector edify the notion that
the FTC is tightening the merger clearance noose in deals involving patent
acquisitions.121 Notably, the FTC has recently changed its policy regarding
exclusive patent license transfers in the pharmaceutical sector. As of 2013,
licenses providing an exclusive licensee with “all commercially significant
rights” over a patent in a particular therapeutic field will have to file an HSR
filing before the FTC.122 Previously, only a limited number of license
transfers that involved the right to make use and sell certain products had to
be reported to the antitrust authorities.123 By this shift in its policy, the FTC
that typically reviews deals in the healthcare sector is expanding its
jurisdiction over transactions involving patents. In light of the lack of
detailed guidance on which pharmaceutical deals will have to be reported to
the antitrust authorities, many corporations might decide to file the HSR
filing as a precautionary measure. These corporations, in turn, and in view
of the Bosch and Motorola Mobility outcomes, risk facing a more stringent
scrutiny from the FTC.
There is a significant difference in the policy the DOJ adopted when
reviewing mergers involving SEPs. In fact, the DOJ published a statement
announcing the closing of its investigations into the Google/Motorola
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Finalizes Amendments to the Premerger Notification Rules
Related to the Transfer of Exclusive Patent Rights in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Nov. 6, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/ftc-finalizes-amendments-premergernotification-rules-related.
122. See Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 FED. REG. 68705
(Nov.
15,
2013)
(to
be
codified
16
CFR
pt.
801),
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/15/2013-27027/premerger-notification-reporting-andwaiting-period-requirements.
123. Id.
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Mobility, Rockstar/Bidco and Apple/Novell mergers.124 These three leading
cases serve to display such divergence. In the Google-Motorola Mobility
merger, more than 17,000 issued patents and 6,800 applications included
SEPs relevant to wireless devices were at stake.125 In the Rockstar/Bidco, a
partnership including RIM, Microsoft and Apple, was formed to acquire
patents at the Nortel bankruptcy auction, and to license and distribute them
to certain partners.126 Many of these patents were SEPS with licensing
commitments through SSOs.127 Finally, in the Apple/Novell merger, Apple
also acquired patents with cross-licensing commitments on a royalty-free
basis from Novell-CPTN to be used in the Linux system.128 In these three
transactions, the DOJ determined that competition would unlikely decrease
and that market dynamics would not change significantly.129 In this regard,
it may be concluded that the DOJ might be reconsidering other policy tool
options to deal with SEP issues in the context of antitrust.
2. The European Union
The EU is no alien to the use of merger control to review IP related
issues affecting the merging parties. In 2011, Google filed a transaction
before the EC merger control directorate. whereby it planned to acquire
Motorola Mobility.130 As part of the deal, Google proposed to acquire
Motorola’s patent portfolio amounting to approximately 7,000 to 8,000
patents.131 The EC cleared the transaction, but not without reviewing
Motorola Mobility’s patent portfolio.132 Eventually, in the words of Almunia,
“[W]e concluded that Google’s acquisition of Motorola’s large portfolio of
standard-essential patents for mobile devices would not lead the merged
entity to foreclose other suppliers, also thanks to existing FRAND

124. See Press Release, DOJ, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its
Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and
the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (RIM)
of certain Nortel Networks Corporation patents, and the acquisition by Apple of certain Novell Inc.
patents (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrustdivision-its-decision-close-its-investigations.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Merger Procedure Article 6(1)(b) Decision (EC), Case No COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola
Mobility
(Feb.
13,
2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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commitments.”133 Notwithstanding the clearance of Google’s deal, in April
2014, the EC found that Motorola Mobility was in breach of EU competition
law over its use of SEPs.134
The deal involving Microsoft and Nokia is another example of how the
EC could use the merger review procedures to scrutinize companies’ IP
strategies. The merger was unconditionally cleared, but not without a debate
over the possibility of Nokia being able to extract higher returns from this
portfolio. In relation to the IP involved the transaction, the EC considered
that:
[A]ny possible competition concerns, which might arise from the conduct
of Nokia, following the transaction, in the licensing of the patent portfolio
for smart mobile devices which it has retained falls outside the scope of
the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission cannot take account of such
concerns in the assessment of the current transaction. Indeed, Nokia is the
seller whereas the Commission’s investigation relates to the merged
entity. However, the Commission will remain vigilant and closely monitor
Nokia’s post-merger licensing practices under EU antitrust rules, in
particular Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) that prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position.135

In relation to the approach taken by the EC, Commissioner Almunia publicly
stated “If Nokia were to take illegal advantage of its patents in the future, we
will open an antitrust case—but I sincerely hope we will not have to.”136
III. THE IMPACT OF THE USE OF DIFFERENT POLICY TOOLS
Based on the foregoing, a few broad trends with respect to competition
law’s treatment of FRAND encumbered SEPs are discernible. First, in the
United States and in light of the eBay decision, there is movement towards
equitable analysis of such cases—a shift from the previous trend of
automatic injunctions in favor of patent holders and an increasing desire
from antitrust agencies to have a word on this subject. Next, there is
increasing propensity to view SEP related patents issues as an antitrust
violation leading to a review on a post facto basis by the relevant competition
courts, notably in the EU. Finally, another palpable trend is the

133. See Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, EC, Almunia Speech on Intellectual
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-131042_en.htm.
134. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm
135. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1210_en.htm
136. See Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, EC, Almunia Speech on Intellectual
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-131042_en.htm.
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predisposition of the EU and US competition authorities to consider
patent/SEP issues at the merger review stage.
In isolation, these developments may seem innocuous; however, given
the widening of the international competition canvas, each of these moves
may have significant internal reverberations. This is particularly the case
when mature competition authorities’ developments serve to validate
emerging competition systems’ opportunistic decisions, to the detriment of
bona fide business interests. The effects of the above cases considered as a
sum reveal a trend that has diverse impacts at national, transatlantic and
international levels. These conclusions are easier understood when
responding to questions on its bearings on the institutional design of
agencies, the cooperation between agencies and eventually the international
dimension of such decisions.
A. National Impact and the Effect on Institutional Design
An increasing amount of attention is being devoted to the impact of
institutional design in the policy outcomes of competition agencies.
Similarly, it is important to note the competition agencies’ case outcomes
also may have an impact on the institutional design and lifecycle of the
agencies The comparison of the FTC and DOJ cases included in part two of
this paper discloses that either agency has opted for a different policy tool to
advance its agenda relating to antitrust in the IP arena. In this respect,
whereas to a certain extent the DOJ seems to prefer to rely on advocacy, the
FTC has opted to continue with its enforcement agenda.
In view of the above, the institutional implications cannot to be ignored.
On the one hand, from a business perspective, it is easy to imagine that
corporations with patent portfolios will start developing a preference for the
DOJ review of transactions. When choosing enforcement as a preferred
policy tool to advance an antitrust agenda in the IP field, the FTC is
simultaneously imposing a deterrence effect towards its institution from a
market perspective. This is due to the fact that corporations understand the
outcome of the FTC cases as a decision of the agency, using its merger
review mandate to take advantage of businesses and require an entire menu
of potential antitrust issues for the agency to decide.137
On the other hand, the existence of the FTC is based principally on its
expertise, i.e. consumer protection and antitrust. Some politicians may
137. Dina Kallay, Director, I.P. & Competition at Ericsson. Inc., New Considerations in I.P. Antitrust and Negotiating Standard Essential Patents, Global Competitive Rev., 3rd Annual Antitrust
Leaders Forum (Feb. 7, 2014).
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understand a policy tool that extends the arms of antitrust into other domains,
as if the FTC is overarching its institutional mandate. Against this
background, the choice of enforcement as a policy tool in the field of IP risks
the FTC no longer being considered the agency exclusively dedicated to the
implementation of antitrust and consumer protection commands.
Consequently, it is less likely that courts will easily grant deference to the
agency’s decisions, particularly if the statutory command used to that end is
§ 5 of the FTC Act.138 As such, the FTC might be imposing more difficulties
before courts to hear antitrust and consumer core cases by imposing higher
barriers to succeed in its core policy outcomes.
Finally, in a context where institutional duplicities are at the heart of
public expenditure cuts, and taking into consideration that most competition
systems count with a single agency, the FTC’s policy tool does not help its
future. Recent trends in institutional design of agencies point to the
conclusion that multiagency competition systems are moving towards the
unification of agencies.139 Eventually, if the United States follows the former
trend, the agency with the best reputation among the different stakeholders
(congress, private sector, etc.) will survive.
B. Transatlantic Impact and the Effect on Dynamic Developments
Recent developments have shifted the original idea of antitrust law
being inherently in conflict with IP. In fact, the current view offers the notion
that IP and antitrust are complementary in encouraging innovation, industry
and competition. In line with this current view, there seems to be
convergence between the United States and the EU with respect to the idea
that antitrust policy has a role to play in relation to certain IP matters, and
particularly addresses patent hold up. Nonetheless, there seems to still be
some divergence with regards to the choice of policy tool to do so.
As previously stated, the EU has historically been the jurisdiction
focusing on enforcement rather than litigation from an antitrust policy
perspective. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the EC has used competition
related legislation to decide on cases potentially involving hold-ups.
Differently, the US has repeatedly stated that antitrust law and policy should
not constrain the legitimate exercise of IP rights by for example stating
138. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929 (2010).
139. See William E.Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, The George Washington University,
UNCTAD-Benchmarking Competition Authorities: A Global Survey of Major Institutional
Characteristics,
UNCTAD-RPP
Meeting
(July
7,
2013),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/RPP2013_LopezGaldos_en.pdf.
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that”we need to ensure that the application of antitrust laws does not
illegitimately stifle innovation and creation by condemning pro-competitive
activities that would maximize incentives for investments or efficiencymaximizing business arrangements.”140 As a result, US policy tools other
than enforcement, such as advocacy, have played a key role in shaping its
competition system.
The evolution of US antitrust laws is characterized as the pursuit of
consumer welfare by relying on accumulated knowledge and economic
analysis embedded in the “rule of reason” analytical framework. It is, in fact,
the rule of reason and its permeability to economic analysis that has allowed
U.S. antitrust to evolve throughout the years. The apparent shift in the US
tradition towards preferring enforcement tools with regards to hold-ups may
eventually impact the dynamic nature of US antitrust, to the benefit of more
stagnant EU competition developments. The continuation of an enforcement
policy vis-à-vis SEPs in the United States lacking substantial economic
analysis may hinder the evolution of a more sophisticated approach to the
matters and to the benefit of consumers. Furthermore, the consequence of
opting for a more European-styled policy tool reassures the EU’s
enforcement nature competition system to the detriment of the US advocacy
agenda.
C. International Impact and the Effect in Emerging Competition Systems
In 2006, China announced the 2020 Plan, which contained a strategy to
move from a “Made in China” to a “Made by China” economy.141 The 2020
Plan included the objective to invest 2.5% of the Chinese GDP in research
and development.142 It is expected that by 2020, key Chinese companies (e.g.,
Haier, Legend, Huawei, Tsingdao) will set up innovation centers to boost
technological transformation.143 In fact, by 2006, the Chinese government
already provided a fund of 700 million yuan to boost protection of Chinese

140. Remarks by Makan Delrahim Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S.
Department of Justice Presented at American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting
Washington, D.C. “US and EU Approaches to the Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual Property Licensing:
Observations from the Enforcement Perspective”, 1 April, 2004.
141. See, e.g., News Update, CAS Clarifies Its Development Vision in the Next 15 Years, CHINESE
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (Mar. 30, 2006), http://english.cas.cn/; China is considering investments of up to
$1.5 trillion over five years in seven strategic industries, NEXT BIG FUTURE (Dec. 5, 2010),
http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/12/china-is-considering-investments-of-up.html.
142. See, e.g., Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-Year Science and
Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006 (Magazine), at 38.
143. See George S. Yip, Bruce McKern, China’s Next Strategic Advantage: From Imitation to
Innovation, MIT Press, 2016.
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brands and patents.144 However, the 2020 Plan and its success are at
crossroads with China’s antitrust policy adopted in 2008.
Along with other nascent competition regimes, China’s competition law
establishes a competition system with a multiplicity of goals, such as
consumer welfare or the healthy development of the socialist market
economy.145 One of the peculiarities of the Chinese competition regime is
that the competition law includes some provisions that touch upon IPR
policies. In particular, Article 55 states,
[T]his law shall not apply to the conduct of undertakings to exercise their
intellectual property rights in accordance with the relevant laws and
regulations on intellectual property rights; however, this Law shall apply
to the conduct of undertakings to eliminate or restrict market competition
by abusing their intellectual property rights’.146

In 2012, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”)
clarified that abuses of IPRs would fall under the general prohibitions of
competition, such as anticompetitive agreements or mergers and abuse of
dominance.147
In this context, it may not be far from the truth to conclude that recent
developments in more mature competition regimes (viz. EU and United
States) relating to the intersection of IPR policies and competition laws
might be sending a wrong message to other regimes. For instance, the recent
decisions of U.S. and EU authorities could be interpreted as a validation to
the Chinese regime by confirming that competition provisions are good tools
to shape IPR Policies.
The use of antitrust to police contractual opportunism is seen by some
Chinese corporations as a window of opportunity to export this use of
antitrust to enable the Chinese corporations to obtain IP related advantages
from SEP owners. Illustratively, ZTE’s welcomed the Advocate General’s
resolution, as it considers that
[t]his opinion is a further step towards clarifying that the EC law restricts
the availability of injunctions under SEPs. It makes clear that if the patent

144. See, e.g., Terence P. Stewart, China’s Industrial Subsidies Study: High Technology, Vol. 1, 56–
57
(Trade
Lawyers
Advisory
Group
April
2007),
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Industrial%20Subsidies%20Hig
h%20Technology.pdf.
145. See David J. Gerber, Economics, Law and Institutions: The Shaping of Chinese Competition
Law, 26 WASH. U.L.J. & POL’Y 271 (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285102.
146. See Bruce M. Owen, Sun Su & Wentong Zheng, China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The
Antimonopoly Law and Beyond (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 339, April 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=978810, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.978810.
147. See D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 77
(2013).
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holder has given a FRAND licensing commitment, seeking an injunction
to leverage licensing deals may have the effect of distorting
competition.’148 In particular Guo Xiaoming, Chief Legal Officer of ZTE,
said: ‘ZTE is delighted that the position of the Advocate General is so
closely aligned with its own position on injunctions under SEPs. There
seems to be a convergence between ZTE’s and the AG’s approaches
towards a good compromise between rewarding innovation whilst not
unfairly blocking companies from providing standard compatible
products. The position of the AG would also reduce the ability of NPEs to
act unfairly in negotiations with technology companies.’149

In the merger field, the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
on Google’s acquisition on Motorola Mobility illustrates this
phenomenon.150 Whereas the merger was reviewed by several jurisdictions
including the USA and the EU, only China conditionally approved the
transaction. The remedy consisted of obliging Google to license, free of
charge, Android for a period of five years to the benefit of the Chinese
Android platform and in order to honor Motorola’s existing FRAND
commitments. 151
In the context of monopoly regulation, China is willing to impose the
broadest essential facility doctrine existing worldwide. In addition, it is
worth noting that the Chinese state upholds the decisions on standard
setting.152 The wording of the Draft IP Enforcement Regulation states that it
is a competition violation to refuse to license an IPR that is an essential
facility.153
This use of antitrust laws to justify protectionist IPR policies could be
particularly important in view of the Plan 2020. On the one hand, China has
presented itself with a solid commitment to modernize its IPR policies, boost

148. See ZTE Welcomes Advocate General’s Opinion on Patent Licensing; Clearer Legal Standard
Could
Stop
Injunction
Abuse
by
NPEs,
BUSINESS WIRE
(Nov.
21,
2014),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141121005540/en/ZTE-Welcomes-Advocate-GeneralsOpinion-Patent-Licensing#.VNJLkEZ0xFo.
149. Id.
150. See Announcement No. 25, 2012, Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China,
Announcement of Approval with Additional Restrictive Conditions of the Acquisition of Motorola
Mobility by Google (May 31, 2012).
151. Id.
152. See Sokol & Zheng, supra note 151, at 81.
153. See 关于知识产权领域反垄断执法的指南 [Guide on Antimonopoly Law Enforcement in the
Field of Intellectual Property Rights], State Administration for Industry and Commerce Task Force,
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP_Practice_in_China/Chinese%20IP%20Law%20
%20Regulations/SAICDraft%202012%20China%20Guidelines%20on%20Antimonopoly%20law%20enforcement%20in%20I
P%20field.pdf. For the latest version of the draft regulation, see 工商行政管理机关禁止滥用知识产权
排除、限制竞争行为的规定[Rules on the Prohibition of Abuses of Intellectual Property Rights for
Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting Competition] [Draft for Comments] (Sept. 18, 2013).
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research and development, and become a leading reference in innovation. On
the other hand, for those sectors or markets where the 2020 Plan fails to
succeed, the Chinese government could still protect its companies from
foreign IPRs by using its competition law. And this could be particularly
important in the FRAND arena, where worldwide prices and negotiating
dynamics may stoop to the bottom.154 Consequently, Chinese antitrust
authorities could strengthen an anti-patent policy disguised under
international competition practices to the detriment of others, but not for
Chinese companies.
The above-described scenario is a strategy that would make Chinese
corporations benefit from the positive outcomes of market competition and
develop their business under the safety net of competition law. The Chinese
government could use this strategy when Chinese corporations cannot
meritoriously win in the free market game. This is the main reason why
Western and more mature competition systems should consider recent
developments in those cases that deal with the intersection of IP and
competition laws, since a narrow view of the challenges faced internally
might be preventing authorities from observing that it is not just the elephant
in the room that needs to be tamed, but the hungry dragon next door.
IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust agencies, notably including more mature ones, count on
different policy tools to advance antitrust agendas with the objective of
maximizing consumer welfare. Some of these policy tools include advocacy
or enforcement actions. Nonetheless, the misinterpretation of the antitrust
norms and misuse of such policy tools may play against consumer welfare.
It seems that antitrust agencies both in the United States and EU have a
renewed interest to address SEPs related concerns with a particular focus on
patent hold ups. From a U.S. perspective, while the increasing advocacy
efforts are welcome, the enforcement trend lead by the FTC should sound
alarm bells. Similarly, the EU seems to be going down a perilous path, too.
In particular, the United States’ latest enforcement actions in the field
of SEPs do not represent a smart institutional strategic decision. The
expansive use of § 5 of the FTC Act to challenge patent hold-ups is likely to
play against the FTC when seeking deference from courts in cases not related
to IPRs. Further, the use of merger control provisions to advance the
opportunity to review other antitrust concerns having nothing to do with the
154. See Sokol & Zheng, supra note 151, at 73 (“What happens in China on FRAND now impacts
decision-making in the boardrooms of Silicon Valley.”)
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merger and extort voluntary commitments will continue to turn the business
community against the FTC. Eventually, the reputation of the FTC
individually, and the U.S. competition system widely (including the DOJ),
as a credible and leading regime might be negatively impacted.
Finally, these enforcement decisions may set a bad precedent globally
and create a motivated and self-centered agenda for any other competition
system that wants to place vested interests of SEP owners above public
welfare. Living in a global pond, mature agencies need to be wary of how
they row their boats, for they cannot later complain that others, following
their lead, are playing unfairly.

